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Subgame perfect implementation:
A new result
Haoyang Wu ∗
Abstract
This paper concerns what will happen if quantum mechanics is concerned in sub-
game perfect implementation. The main result is: When additional conditions are
satisfied, the traditional characterization on subgame perfect implementation shall
be amended by virtue of a quantum stage mechanism. Furthermore, by using an
algorithmic stage mechanism, this amendment holds in the macro world too.
Key words: Mechanism design; Subgame perfect implementation; Quantum game
theory.
1 Introduction
The theory of mechanism design plays an important role in economics. Maskin
[1] provides an almost complete characterization of social choice rules that
are Nash implementable when the number of agents is at least three. Moore
and Repullo [2], Abreu and Sen [3] gave the framework of subgame perfect
implementation. Vartiainen [4] proposed a full characterization on subgame
perfect implementation.
Recently, Wu [5] propose that when an additional condition is satisfied, the
sufficient conditions for Nash implementation shall be amended by virtue of a
quantum mechanism. Although current experimental technologies restrict the
quantum mechanism to be commercially available [6], Wu [7] propose an algo-
rithmic mechanism by which agents can benefit from the quantum mechanism
immediately when the number of agents is not very large (e.g., less than 20).
Furthermore, the traditional results on two-agent Nash implementation and
Bayesian implementation are revised [8,9].
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Following the aforementioned works, this paper investigates what will happen
if the quantum mechanics is generalized to subgame perfect implementation.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 recalls preliminaries
of subgame perfect implementation given by Abreu and Sen [3]. In Section
3, a novel condition multi -α is defined. In addition, we give an example of a
Pareto-inefficient social choice correspondence (SCC) that can be implemented
in subgame perfect equilibrium. Section 4 and 5 are the main parts of this
paper, in which we will propose quantum and algorithmic stage mechanisms
respectively. Section 6 draws the conclusions.
2 Preliminaries
Let J = {1, · · · , N} be the set of individuals. Let A denote the set of outcomes.
The set of preference profiles is denoted by Θ. For a profile θ ∈ Θ, agent
j ∈ J has preference ordering Rj(θ) on the set A. Let P j(θ) and Ij(θ) be the
strict preference relation and the indifference relation associated with Rj(θ),
respectively. For each profile θ ∈ Θ, an SCC f picks a non-empty subset f(θ)
of the set A. An extensive form mechanism is an array Γ = (K,P, U, C, h). K
is the game tree with origin n0. The set of non-terminal nodes of K is denoted
by M . The player, information and choice partitions are denoted P , U and C
respectively. The function h is the payoff function and associates with every
path in the tree an element of the set A.
For any profile θ ∈ Θ, the pair (Γ, θ) constitutes an extensive form game.
A pure strategy for player j is a function which specifies a choice at every
information set of player j. The set of pure strategies for player j is denoted
Sj. A pure strategy profile is an N -tuple of pure strategies, one for each player.
The set of pure strategy profiles is denoted S = S1×· · ·×SN . Let M0 denote
the set of all nodes which are roots of subgames in Γ. A subgame is identified
by its root m ∈ M0. For all j ∈ J and s ∈ S, the set Σ(j, s) is defined by
Σ(j, s) = {s′ ∈ S|s′i = si, i 6= j}. Thus, Σ(j, s) is the set of strategy profiles in
which players other than j play according to s.
For all nodes n and s ∈ S, let a(n, s) denote the outcome obtained under
s, conditional on starting at node n. For all nodes n, s ∈ S and j ∈ J , let
A(j, n, s) = {a(n, s′)|s′ ∈ Σ(j, s)}. The strategy profile s ∈ S is a subgame
perfect equilibrium (SPE) of the game (Γ, θ) if for every subgame m ∈ M0
and every agent j ∈ J , a(m, s) is θ-maximal for player j in A(j,m, s). Let
SPE(Γ, θ) denote the set of subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes of (Γ, θ).
Let SPE(Γ, θ) denote the set of subgame perfect equilibrium strategy profiles
of (Γ, θ). The SCC f is subgame perfect implementable if there exists an
extensive form mechanism Γ such that SPE(Γ, θ) = f(θ) for all θ ∈ Θ.
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An SCC f satisfies no-veto power (NVP) with respect to B ⊆ A if ∀θ ∈ Θ,
∀a ∈ B, [aRj(θ)b for all b ∈ B and j ∈ K, where K ⊆ J and |K| ≥ N − 1]⇒
a ∈ f(θ). An SCC f satisfies monotonicity if for every pair of profiles θ, φ ∈ Θ,
and for every a ∈ f(θ), whenever aRj(θ)b implies aRj(φ)b (∀j ∈ J), one
has that a ∈ f(φ) [10]. An SCC f satisfies Condition α with respect to the
set B ⊆ A if range f ⊆ B, and if for all profiles θ, φ ∈ Θ and outcomes
a ∈ f(θ) − f(φ), there exist a sequence of agents j(θ, φ; a) ≡ (j(0), · · · , j(l))
and a sequence of outcomes a0, a1, · · · , al, al+1 in B (where a0 = a), such that:
(i) akR
j(k)(θ)ak+1, k = 0, · · · , l;
(ii) al+1P
j(l)(φ)al;
(iii) ak is not φ-maximal for j(k) in B, k = 0, · · · , l;
(iv) if al+1 is φ-maximal in B for all agents except j(l), then either l = 0 or
j(l − 1) 6= j(l).
Theorem 1: If f is subgame perfect implementable, then f satisfies Condition
α with respect to some B ⊆ A. Let N ≥ 3. If f satisfies Condition α and NVP
with respect to some B ⊆ A, then f is subgame perfect implementable.
To facilitate the following discussion, here we cite the stage mechanism used
to implement f as follows (P298, [3]).
First Stage (Stage 0): Each agent j ∈ J announces a triplet (θj , aj, nj), where
θj ∈ Θ, aj ∈ A, and nj is a non-negative integer:
Rule (1): If N − 1 agents announce the same pair θ, a ∈ f(θ), the outcome
is a, unless the remaining agent i announces φ, where a ∈ f(θ) − f(φ) and
i = j(0) in the sequence j(θ, φ; a). In the latter event, go to Stage 1.
Rule (2): In all other cases, the agent who announces the highest integer (break
ties in favor of the agent with the lowest index) can select any outcome in B.
Subsequent Stages (Stage k, k=1, · · · , l): Each agent j ∈ J can either raise a
“flag” or announce a non-negative integer:
Rule (3): If at least N−1 agents raise flags, the agent j(k−1) (in the sequence
j(θ, φ; a)) can select any outcome in B.
Rule (4): If at least N − 1 agents announce zero, the outcome is ak, unless
j(k) does not announce zero, in which case go to the next stage, or, if k = l,
implement al+1.
Rule (5): In all other cases, the agent who announces the highest integer can
select any outcome in B.
3 Condition multi-α
Definition 1: An SCC f satisfies Condition multi -α with respect to the set
B ⊆ A if range f ⊆ B, and for two profiles θ, φ ∈ Θ, a ∈ f(θ) − f(φ), there
exist 2 ≤ ∆ ≤ N sequences of agents jδ(θ, φ; a) ≡ (jδ(0), · · · , jδ(lδ)) (where
1 ≤ δ ≤ ∆, and no agent belongs to two or more sequences), and ∆ sequences
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of outcomes aδ0, a
δ
1, · · · , aδlδ , aδlδ+1 (where 1 ≤ δ ≤ ∆, aδ0 = a) in B, such that
for every 1 ≤ δ ≤ ∆,
(i) aδkR
jδ(k)(θ)aδk+1, k = 0, · · · , lδ.
(ii) aδlδ+1P
jδ(lδ)(φ)aδlδ .
(iii) aδk is not φ-maximal for j
δ(k) in B, k = 0, · · · , lδ.
(iv) If aδlδ+1 is φ-maximal in B for all agents except j
δ(lδ), then either lδ = 0,
or jδ(lδ − 1) 6= jδ(lδ).
Table 1: A Pareto-inefficient SCC f that satisfies NVP and Condition α.
Profile θ1 Profile θ2
Alice Apple Lily Cindy Alice Apple Lily Cindy
u4 u1 u4 u1 u4 u1 u3 u1
u2 u3 u3 u3 u1 u2 u1 u4
u1 u4 u1 u2 u2 u4 u2 u3
u3 u2 u2 u4 u3 u3 u4 u2
f(θ1) = {u1} f(θ2) = {u2}
Example 1: Consider the SCC f specified in Table 1. J={Alice, Apple, Lily,
Cindy}, A = {u1, u2, u3, u4}, Θ = {θ1, θ2}. Let B = A. f is Pareto-inefficient
from the viewpoints of agents because in profile θ2, each agent j ∈ J prefers a
Pareto-efficient outcome u1 to u2 ∈ f(θ2). Obviously, f satisfies NVP. Consider
u1 ∈ f(θ1), for every j ∈ J , whenever u1Rj(θ1)b implies u1Rj(θ2)b (b ∈ A),
but u1 /∈ f(θ2). Therefore, f does not satisfy monotonicity and is not Nash
implementable [1].
Now let us check whether f satisfies Condition α and multi -α. Consider two
profiles θ1 and θ2, and outcome u1 ∈ f(θ1)− f(θ2), then ∆ = 2.
1) For the case of δ = 1, l1 = 1, j1(0) = Alice, j1(1) = Apple; a10 = u1,
a11 = u3, a
1
2 = u2.
(i): a10R
j1(0)(θ1)a
1
1, a
1
1R
j1(1)(θ1)a
1
2, since u1R
Alice(θ1)u3, u3R
Apple(θ1)u2;
(ii): a12P
j1(1)(θ2)a
1
1, since u2P
Apple(θ2)u3;
(iii): a10 and a
1
1 are not θ2-maximal for j
1(0) and j1(1) in B respectively, since
u1 and u3 are not θ2-maximal for Alice and Apple in B respectively;
(iv): a12 (i.e., u2) is not θ2-maximal in B for all agents except j
1(1) (i.e., Apple).
Hence, (i)-(iv) are satisfied.
2) For the case of δ = 2, l2 = 1, j2(0) = Lily, j2(1) = Cindy; a20 = u1, a
2
1 = u2,
a22 = u4.
(i): a20R
j2(0)(θ1)a
2
1, a
2
1R
j2(1)(θ1)a
2
2, since u1R
Lily(θ1)u2, and u2R
Cindy(θ1)u4.
(ii): a22P
j2(1)(θ2)a
2
1, since u4P
Cindy(θ2)u2;
(iii): a20 and a
2
1 are not θ2-maximal for j
2(0) and j2(1) in B respectively, since
u1 and u2 are not θ2-maximal for Lily and Cindy in B respectively.
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(iv): a22 (i.e., u4) is not θ2-maximal in B for all agents except j
2(1) (i.e., Cindy).
Hence, (i)-(iv) are satisfied. Therefore, f satisfies Condition α and multi -α.
Given profile θ2, since u1 is Pareto-efficient for all agents, it looks reasonable
that in Stage 0 each agent j ∈ J announces (θ1, u1, ∗) in order to obtain
u1 by rule (1) (where ∗ stands for any legal value). But according to Line
19 and the last line of Page 294 [3], agent j1(0) = Alice has incentives to
unilaterally deviate from (θ1, u1, ∗) to (θ2, ∗, ∗) in order to obtain u4, which
is θ2-maximal for Alice in B (See Page 294, the third line to the last, [3]).
Similarly, agent j2(0) = Lily also has incentives to unilaterally deviate from
(θ1, u1, ∗) to (θ2, ∗, ∗) in order to obtain u3.
Note that either Alice or Lily can certainly obtain her expected outcome
only if one of them deviates. Since all agents are rational and self-interested,
nobody is willing to give up and let the others benefit. Therefore, both Alice
and Lily will deviate from (θ1, u1, ∗) to (θ2, ∗, ∗). Hence, the Pareto-efficient
outcome u1 cannot be implemented in subgame perfect equilibrium. It should
be noted that in the end, rule (2) will be triggered and the final outcome is
uncertain among B.
4 A quantum stage mechanism
As we have seen in Example 1, although the SCC f is Pareto-inefficient from
the viewpoints of agents, f is subgame perfect implementable according to
the stage mechanism [3]. Following Ref. [5], we will propose a (l + 1)-stage
quantum mechanism that let the Pareto-efficient outcome u1 be implemented
in subgame perfect equilibrium in profile θ2. The difference between the quan-
tum and traditional stage mechanisms is the way by which each agent j ∈ J
submits (θj , aj, nj) to the designer in Stage 0.
4.1 Assumptions
According to Eq (4) in Ref. [11], two-parameter quantum strategies are drawn
from the set:
ωˆ(ξ, η) ≡

e
iη cos(ξ/2) i sin(ξ/2)
i sin(ξ/2) e−iη cos(ξ/2)

 , (1)
Ωˆ ≡ {ωˆ(ξ, η) : ξ ∈ [0, pi], η ∈ [0, pi/2]}, Jˆ ≡ cos(γ/2)Iˆ⊗∆ + i sin(γ/2)σˆx⊗∆,
where γ is an entanglement measure, and ∆ is specified in Condition multi -α.
Iˆ ≡ ωˆ(0, 0), Dˆ∆ ≡ ωˆ(pi, pi/∆), Cˆ∆ ≡ ωˆ(0, pi/∆). Denote by Z+ the set of
non-negative integer.
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Without loss of generality, we assume that:
1) Each agent jδ(0) (1 ≤ δ ≤ ∆) has a quantum coin δ (qubit) and a classical
card jδ(0). The basis vectors |C〉 = (1, 0)T , |D〉 = (0, 1)T of a quantum coin
denote head up and tail up respectively.
2) Each agent jδ(0) (1 ≤ δ ≤ ∆) independently performs a local unitary
operation on his/her own quantum coin. The set of agent jδ(0)’s operation is
Ωˆδ = Ωˆ. A strategic operation chosen by agent j
δ(0) is denoted as ωˆδ ∈ Ωˆδ. If
ωˆδ = Iˆ, then ωˆδ(|C〉) = |C〉, ωˆδ(|D〉) = |D〉; If ωˆδ = Dˆ∆, then ωˆδ(|C〉) = |D〉,
ωˆδ(|D〉) = |C〉. Iˆ denotes “Not flip”, DˆN denotes “Flip”.
3) The two sides of a card are denoted as Side 0 and Side 1. The message
written on the Side 0 (or Side 1) of card jδ(0) is denoted as card(jδ(0), 0) (or
card(jδ(0), 1)). A typical card written by agent jδ(0) is described as cjδ(0) =
(card(jδ(0), 0), card(jδ(0), 1)) ∈ Θ× A× Z+ ×Θ× A× Z+.
4) There is a device that can measure the state of ∆ coins and send messages
to the designer.
4.2 Condition λSPE
Given ∆ ≥ 2 agents, consider the payoff to the ∆-th agent, we denote by $C···CC
the expected payoff when all ∆ agents choose Iˆ (the corresponding collapsed
state is |C · · ·CC〉), and denote by $C···CD the expected payoff when the ∆-
th agent chooses Dˆ∆ and the first ∆ − 1 agents choose Iˆ (the corresponding
collapsed state is |C · · ·CD〉). $D···DD and $D···DC are defined similarly.
Definition 2: Given an SCC f that satisfies Condition multi -α, define Con-
dition λSPE as follows:
1) λSPE1 : For the profiles θ, φ specified in Condition multi -α and the outcome
a ∈ f(θ)− f(φ), aRj(φ)b (b ∈ f(φ)) for every j ∈ J , and aP i(φ)b for at least
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one i ∈ J .
2) λSPE2 : Consider the payoff to the ∆-th agent, $C···CC > $D···DD, i.e., he/she
prefers the expected payoff of a certain outcome (generated by rule (1)) to the
expected payoff of an uncertain outcome (generated by rule (2)).
3) λSPE3 : Consider the payoff to the ∆-th agent,
$C···CC > $C···CD[1− sin2 γ sin2(pi/∆)] + $D···DC sin2 γ sin2(pi/∆).
4.3 Working steps of the quantum stage mechanism
In the beginning of the traditional stage mechanism, each agent j ∈ J directly
announces a message mj (i.e., the triplet (θj , aj, nj)) to the designer, then
N agents participate the stage mechanism as specified by rules (1)-(5). As a
comparison, in the beginning of a quantum stage mechanism, the message mj
(j ∈ J) is generated by another way.
The setup of the quantum stage mechanism is depicted in Fig. 1. The working
steps of a quantum stage mechanism are described as follows:
Step 1: Given an SCC f and a profile ξ ∈ Θ, if f satisfies Condition multi -α
and λSPE, and ξ is equal to the profile φ specified in Condition λSPE1 , then go
to Step 3.
Step 2: Each agent j ∈ J sets mj = (θj, aj , nj) (where θj ∈ Θ, aj ∈ A,
nj ∈ Z+). Go to Step 9.
Step 3: The state of each quantum coin δ (1 ≤ δ ≤ ∆) is set as |C〉. The initial
state of the ∆ quantum coins is |ψ0〉 = |C · · ·CC〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆
.
Step 4: Each agent jδ(0) (1 ≤ δ ≤ ∆) sets cjδ(0) = ((θ, a, ∗), (φ, ∗, ∗)), where
θ, φ, a are specified in Condition λSPE1 . Each agent j ∈ J −
⋃∆
δ=1 j
δ(0) sets
cj = ((θ, a, ∗), (θj, aj , nj)).
Step 5: Let ∆ quantum coins be entangled by Jˆ . |ψ1〉 = Jˆ |ψ0〉.
Step 6: Each agent jδ(0) independently performs a local unitary operation ωˆδ
on his/her own quantum coin. |ψ2〉 = [ωˆ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ ωˆ∆]Jˆ |ψ0〉.
Step 7: Let ∆ quantum coins be disentangled by Jˆ+. |ψ3〉 = Jˆ+[ωˆ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗
ωˆ∆]Jˆ |ψ0〉.
Step 8: The device measures the state of ∆ quantum coins. For every 1 ≤
δ ≤ ∆, if the state of quantum coin δ is |C〉 (or |D〉), then the device sends
card(jδ(k), 0) (or card(jδ(k), 1)) as mj
δ(k) (0 ≤ k ≤ lδ) to the designer. For
each agent j ∈ J − ⋃∆δ=1
⋃lδ
k=0 j
δ(k), the device sends mj = (θ, a, nj) to the
designer.
Step 9: The designer receives the overall message m = (m1, · · · , mN ).
Step 10: The agents and the designer continue to participate the rules (1)-(5)
of the traditional stage mechanism. END.
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4.4 New result for subgame perfect implementation
Proposition 1: For N ≥ 3, consider an SCC f that satisfies NVP and Con-
dition α, if f satisfies multi -α and λSPE, then f is not subgame perfect im-
plementable by using the quantum stage mechanism.
Proof : Consider the profiles θ, φ specified in λSPE1 . Since f satisfies Condi-
tion multi -α and λSPE, then the quantum stage mechanism enters Step 3, and
there exist 2 ≤ ∆ ≤ N sequences of agents that satisfy (i)-(iv) of Condition
multi -α. At first sight, each agent jδ(0) (1 ≤ δ ≤ ∆) has incentives to unilat-
erally deviate from (θ, a, ∗) to (φ, ∗, ∗) in order to obtain his/her φ-maximal
outcome (as we have seen in Page 294, [3]).
Consider the payoff to the ∆-th agent (denoted as Laura), when she plays
ωˆ(ξ, η) while the first ∆ − 1 agents play Cˆ∆ = ωˆ(0, pi/∆), according to Refs.
[5,11],
〈$Laura〉 =$C···CC cos2(ξ/2)[1− sin2 γ sin2(η − pi/∆)]
+$C···CD sin
2(ξ/2)[1− sin2 γ sin2(pi/∆)]
+$D···DC sin
2(ξ/2) sin2 γ sin2(pi/∆)
+$D···DD cos
2(ξ/2) sin2 γ sin2(η − pi/∆)
Since Condition λSPE2 is satisfied, then $C···CC > $D···DD, Laura chooses η =
pi/∆ to minimize sin2(η − pi/∆). As a result,
〈$Laura〉 =$C···CC cos2(ξ/2)
+$C···CD sin
2(ξ/2)[1− sin2 γ sin2(pi/∆)]
+$D···DC sin
2(ξ/2) sin2 γ sin2(pi/∆)
Since Condition λSPE3 is satisfied, then Laura prefers ξ = 0, which leads to
〈$Laura〉 = $C···CC . In this case, ωˆLaura(ξ, η) = ωˆ(0, pi/∆) = Cˆ∆.
By symmetry, in Step 6, each agent jδ(0) (1 ≤ δ ≤ ∆) chooses ωˆδ = Cˆ∆. In
Step 8, the collapsed state of each quantum coin δ is |C · · ·CC〉, and mj =
(θ, a, ∗) for each agent j ∈ J . No agent jδ(0) (1 ≤ δ ≤ ∆) is willing to deviate
from (θ, a, ∗) to (φ, ∗, ∗) in the quantum stage mechanism. Consequently, in
profile φ, a ∈ f(θ)− f(φ) can be implemented in subgame perfect equilibrium
by rule (1). Therefore, f is not subgame perfect implementable. 
Let us reconsider Example 1. f satisfies Condition multi -α and λSPE1 . θ =
θ1, φ = θ2. The quantum stage mechanism will enter Step 3 when the true
profile is θ2. Each agent j ∈ {Alice, Lily} sets cj = ((θ1, u1, ∗), (θ2, ∗, ∗)). Each
agent j ∈ {Apple, Cindy} sets cj = ((θ1, u1, ∗), (θj, aj, nj)). For any agent
j ∈ {Alice, Lily}, let her be the last agent. Consider the payoff to the fourth
agent, suppose $CCCC = 3 (the corresponding outcome is u1), $CCCD = 5 (the
corresponding outcome is u4 if j = Alice, and u3 if j = Lily), $DDDC = 0 (the
corresponding outcome is u3 if j = Alice, and u4 if j = Lily), $DDDD = 1
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(the corresponding outcome is uncertain among A). Hence, Condition λSPE2 is
satisfied, and Condition λSPE3 becomes: 3 ≥ 5[1− sin2 γ sin2(pi/2)]. If sin2 γ ≥
0.4, Condition λSPE3 is satisfied. According to Proposition 1, in profile θ2, the
Pareto-efficient outcome u1 is generated in subgame perfect equilibrium by
using the quantum stage mechanism.
5 An algorithmic stage mechanism
Following Ref. [7], in this section we will propose an algorithmic stage mecha-
nism to help agents benefit from the quantum stage mechanism immediately.
In the beginning, we cite the matrix representations of quantum states from
Ref. [7].
5.1 Matrix representations of quantum states
In quantum mechanics, a quantum state can be described as a vector. For
a two-level system, there are two basis vectors: (1, 0)T and (0, 1)T . In the
beginning, we define:
|C〉 =

1
0

 , Iˆ =

1 0
0 1

 , σˆx =

0 1
1 0

 , |ψ0〉 = |C · · ·CC〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆
=


1
0
· · ·
0


2∆×1
(2)
Jˆ = cos(γ/2)Iˆ⊗∆ + i sin(γ/2)σˆ⊗∆x (3)
=


cos(γ/2) i sin(γ/2)
· · · · · ·
cos(γ/2) i sin(γ/2)
i sin(γ/2) cos(γ/2)
· · · · · ·
i sin(γ/2) cos(γ/2)


2∆×2∆
(4)
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For γ = pi/2,
Jˆpi/2 =
1√
2


1 i
· · · · · ·
1 i
i 1
· · · · · ·
i 1


2∆×2∆
, Jˆ+pi/2 =
1√
2


1 −i
· · · · · ·
1 −i
−i 1
· · · · · ·
−i 1


2∆×2∆
(5)
5.2 An algorithm that simulates the quantum operations and measurements
Similar to Ref. [7], in the following we will propose an algorithm that simulates
the quantum operations and measurements in the quantum stage mechanism.
The amendment here is that now the inputs and outputs are adjusted to
the case of subgame perfect implementation. The factor γ is also set as its
maximum pi/2. For ∆ agents, the inputs and outputs of the algorithm are
illustrated in Fig. 2. The Matlab program is given in Fig. 3.
Inputs:
1) ξδ, ηδ, δ = 1, · · · ,∆: the parameters of agent jδ(0)’s local operation ωˆδ,
ξδ ∈ [0, pi], ηδ ∈ [0, pi/2].
2) card(jδ(0), 0), card(jδ(0), 1), δ = 1, · · · ,∆: the information written on the
two sides of agent jδ(0)’s card, where card(jδ(0), 0), card(jδ(0), 1) ∈ Θ×A×
Z+.
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Outputs:
mj
δ(k) (δ = 1, · · · ,∆, k = 0, · · · , lδ): the agent jδ(k)’s message that is sent to
the designer, mj
δ(k) ∈ Θ× A× Z+.
Procedures of the algorithm:
Step 1: Reading parameters ξδ and ηδ from each agent j
δ(0) (δ = 1, · · · ,∆)
(See Fig. 3(a)).
Step 2: Computing the leftmost and rightmost columns of ωˆ1 ⊗ ωˆ2 ⊗ · · · ⊗ ωˆ∆
(See Fig. 3(b)).
Step 3: Computing the vector representation of |ψ2〉 = [ωˆ1⊗· · ·⊗ ωˆ∆]Jˆpi/2|ψ0〉.
Step 4: Computing the vector representation of |ψ3〉 = Jˆ+pi/2|ψ2〉.
Step 5: Computing the probability distribution 〈ψ3|ψ3〉 (See Fig. 3(c)).
Step 6: Randomly choosing a “collapsed” state from the set of all 2∆ possible
states {|C · · ·CC〉, · · · , |D · · ·DD〉} according to the probability distribution
〈ψ3|ψ3〉.
Step 7: For each agent jδ(k) (δ = 1, · · · ,∆, k = 0, · · · , lδ), the algorithm sends
card(jδ(k), 0) (or card(jδ(k), 1)) as the message mj
δ(k) to the designer if the
δ-th basis vector of the “collapsed” state is |C〉 (or |D〉).
Step 8: For each agent j ∈ J − ⋃∆δ=1
⋃lδ
k=0 j
δ(k), the algorithm sends mj =
card(j, 0) to the designer (See Fig. 3(d)).
5.3 An algorithmic version of the quantum stage mechanism
Since the entanglement measure γ is set as its maximum pi/2, the Condition
λSPE shall be revised as λ′SPE.
Definition 6: Given an SCC f that satisfies Condition multi -α, define Con-
dition λ′SPE as follows:
1) λ′SPE1 and λ
′SPE
2 are the same as λ
SPE
1 and λ
SPE
2 respectively.
2) λ′SPE3 : Consider the payoff to the ∆-th agent, $C···CC > $C···CD cos
2(pi/∆)]+
$D···DC sin
2(pi/∆).
Following Ref. [7], after quantum operations and measurements in quantum
stage mechanism are replaced by an algorithm, the quantum stage mechanism
shall be revised as an algorithmic stage mechanism. The working steps of an
algorithmic stage mechanism are described as follows:
Step 1: Given an SCC f and a profile ξ ∈ Θ, if f satisfies Condition multi -α
and λ′SPE, and ξ is equal to the profile φ specified in Condition λ′SPE1 , then
go to Step 3.
Step 2: Each agent j ∈ J sets mj = (θj, aj , nj) (where θj ∈ Θ, aj ∈ A,
nj ∈ Z+). Go to Step 6.
Step 3: Each agent jδ(0) (δ = 1, · · · ,∆) sets cjδ(0) = ((θ, a, ∗), (φ, ∗, ∗)),
11
where θ, φ, a are specified in λ′SPE1 ; Each agent j ∈ J −
⋃∆
δ=1 j
δ(0) sets cj =
((θ, a, ∗), (θj, aj, nj)).
Step 4: Each agent jδ(0) (δ = 1, · · · ,∆) submits ξδ, ηδ, card(jδ(0), 0) and
card(jδ(0), 1) to the algorithm.
Step 5: The algorithm runs in a computer and outputs messages mj (j ∈ J)
to the designer.
Step 6: The designer receives the overall message m = (m1, · · · , mN ).
Step 7: The agents and the designer continue to participate the rules (1)-(5)
of the traditional stage mechanism. END.
Proposition 2: For N ≥ 3, consider an SCC f that satisfies NVP and Con-
dition α, if f satisfies Condition multi -α and λ′SPE, then f is not subgame
perfect implementable by using the algorithmic stage mechanism.
The proof of proposition 2 is straightforward according to Proposition 1 and
Ref. [7]. Note: Although the algorithmic stage mechanism stems from quantum
mechanics, it is completely classical that can be run in a computer. In addition,
Condition λ′SPE is also a classical condition.
6 Conclusions
This paper follows the series of papers on quantum mechanism [5,7,8,9]. In this
paper, the quantum and algorithmic mechanisms in Refs. [5,7] are generalized
to subgame perfect implementation. In Example 1, we show a Pareto-inefficient
SCC f that satisfies NVP and Condition α, but does not satisfies monotonicity.
According to the traditional stage mechanism [3], f can be subgame perfect
implemented. However, by virtue of a quantum stage mechanism, the Pareto-
inefficient SCC f can not be implemented in subgame perfect equilibrium.
Although current experimental technologies restrict the quantum stage mech-
anism to be commercially available, for small-scale cases (e.g., ∆ ≤ 20 [7]),
the algorithmic stage mechanism can help agents benefit from quantum stage
mechanism immediately.
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%***********************************************************
% Subgame perfect implementation: a new result
%***********************************************************
% Programmed by:
%       Dr. Haoyang Wu
%       Wan-Dou-Miao Research Lab
%       China
% Email: hywch@mail.xjtu.edu.cn
%***********************************************************
start_time = cputime;
% N: the number of agents. See the Example 1 given in Section 3.
% Let J={1, 2, 3, 4} represent {Alice, Apple, Lily, Cindy}
N = 4;
agent_name = cell(N,1);
agent_name{1} = 'Alice';
agent_name{2} = 'Apple';
agent_name{3} = 'Lily';
agent_name{4} = 'Cindy';
% : the number of sequences of agents specified in Condition multi-
Delta = 2;
% : the length of the -th sequence
ldelta = zeros(2,1);
ldelta(1) = 1;      % 
ldelta(2 )= 1;      % 
% : the sequences of agents
jdelta = zeros(2,2);
jdelta(1,1) = 1;      % = Alice
jdelta(1,2) = 2;      % = Apple
jdelta(2,1) = 3;      % = Lily
jdelta(2,2) = 4;      % = Cindy
% : the coefficient of entanglement. We simply set gamma to its maximum 
gamma = pi/2;
% ( ) denote the array of parameters of each agent 's unitary operation, 
xi = zeros(Delta,1);
eta = zeros(Delta,1);
% Reading parameters and from each agent ,
xi(1) = 0;
eta(1) = pi/2; %  
xi(2) = 0;
eta(2) = pi/2; %
)2/,0(ˆˆˆ1 piωω == ∆C
)2/,0(ˆˆˆ2 piωω == ∆C
α∆
)(,),0( δδδ ljj L
δδl
δj
)0(1j
)1(1j
)0(2j
)1(2j
2/pi
δξ δη )0(δj ∆= ,,1Lδ
ηξ , )0(δj ∆= ,,1Lδ
γ
11 =l
12 =l
Fig. 3 (a). Reading each agent s parameters     and                   .δξ ∆= ,,1, Lδηδ)0(δj
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Fig. 3 (b). Computing the leftmost and rightmost columns of
% Defining two 2*2 matrices X and Y
X=zeros(2,2);
Y=zeros(2,2);
% In the beginning, X represents the local operation of agent  
X(1,1) = exp(i*eta(1))*cos(xi(1)/2);
X(1,2) = i*sin(xi(1)/2);
X(2,1) = X(1,2);
X(2,2) = exp(- i*eta(1))*cos(xi(1)/2);
row_X=2;
% Computing 
for delta = 2 : Delta
% Y varies from to
Y(1,1) = exp(i*eta(delta))*cos(xi(delta)/2);
Y(1,2) = i*sin(xi(delta)/2);
Y(2,1) = Y(1,2);
Y(2,2) = exp(- i*eta(delta))*cos(xi(delta)/2);
% Computing the leftmost and rightmost columns of Z= X ⊗ Y
Z = zeros(row_X*2, 2);
for row =1 : row_X
Z((row-1)*2+1, 1) = X(row,1) * Y(1,1);
Z((row-1)*2+2, 1) = X(row,1) * Y(2,1);
Z((row-1)*2+1, 2) = X(row,2) * Y(1,2);
Z((row-1)*2+2, 2) = X(row,2) * Y(2,2);
end
X = Z;
row_X = 2 * row_X;
end
% Now the matrix X contains the leftmost and rightmost columns of
1ωˆ
∆⊗⊗⊗ ωωω ˆˆˆ 21 L
∆⊗⊗⊗ ωωω ˆˆˆ 21 L
∆⊗⊗⊗ ωωω ˆˆˆ 21 L
2ωˆ ∆ωˆ
)0(1j
Fig. 3 (c). Computing       ,      ,           .
% Computing 
psi2 = zeros(power(2, Delta),1);
for row =1 : power(2, Delta)
psi2(row) = X(row,1)*cos(gamma/2) + X(row,2)*i*sin(gamma/2);
end
% Computing 
psi3 = zeros(power(2, Delta),1);
for row=1 : power(2, Delta)
psi3(row) = cos(gamma/2)*psi2(row) - i*sin(gamma/2)*psi2(power(2, Delta)-row+1);
end
% Computing the probability distribution
distribution=psi3.*conj(psi3);
distribution=distribution./sum(distribution);
23
ˆ ψψ += J
1212
ˆ]ˆˆˆ[ ψωωωψ J∆⊗⊗⊗= L
33 ψψ
2ψ 3ψ 33 ψψ
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% Randomly choosing a “collapsed” state according to the probability distribution
random_number=rand;
temp=0;
for index=1: power(2, Delta)
temp = temp + distribution(index);
if temp >= random_number
break;
end
end
% collapsed_state: a binary representation of the index of the collapsed state
%   ‘0’ stands for      , ‘1’ stands for  
collapsed_state = dec2bin(index-1);
size_of_collapsed_state = size(collapsed_state);
% Defining an array of messages for N agents
message = cell(N,1);
% For each agent                        , the algorithm generates the message
for delta = 1 : Delta - size_of_collapsed_state(2)
message{jdelta(delta, 1)}=strcat('card(', agent_name(jdelta(delta, 1)),', 0)');
for k = 1 : ldelta(delta)
message{jdelta(delta, k+1)}=strcat('card(',agent_name(jdelta(delta, k+1)),', 0)');
end
end
for index = 1 : size_of_collapsed_state(2)
delta = Delta - size_of_collapsed_state(2) + index;
if collapsed_state(index)=='0'  % Note: '0' stands for |C>
message{jdelta(delta, 1)}=strcat('card(', agent_name(jdelta(delta, 1)),', 0)');
for k =1 : ldelta(delta)
message{jdelta(delta, k+1)}=strcat('card(', agent_name(jdelta(delta, k+1)),', 0)');
end
else
message{jdelta(delta, 1)}=strcat('card(', agent_name(jdelta(delta, 1)),', 1)');
for k =1 : ldelta(delta)
message{jdelta(delta, k+1)}=strcat('card(', agent_name(jdelta(delta, k+1)),', 1)');
end
end
end
% The algorithm sends messages                      to the designer
for j = 1 : N
if size(message{j},2)==0
message{j}=strcat('card(', agent_name(j), ', 0');
end
disp(message{j});
end
end_time = cputime;
runtime=end_time – start_time
33 ψψ
)()0( ,,
δδδ ljj mm L
Nmmm ,,, 21 L
C D
)(,),0( δδδ ljj L
Fig. 3 (d). Computing all messages                     . Nmmm ,,, 21 L
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